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Abstract 
 
EU internal security policy has been in recent years progressively focused on 
prevention of threats and risks. The 2010 Internal Security Strategy for the EU 
highlighted the need for ‘prevention and anticipation’ conceived as a proactive 
intelligence-led approach to EU internal security. A pre-crime framework has been 
widely applied in fields like security studies, police science, criminology, ethics, 
political sociology and political geography, owing to its inherent explanatory 
power. The core element of pre-crime approach is the selection and identification 
of the most probable among abstract risks and dispersed threats, and the profiling, 
or sorting out, of particular social groups or individuals posing presumably 
imminent threats.  This paper aims at inserting the concept of intelligence 
tradecraft into the pre-crime analytical framework and verify the usefulness of 
such an approach to the study of EU internal security governance. The paper will 
focus on ‘intelligence process’ and ‘intelligence product’, i.e. how the 
stakeholders of EU internal security policy construct, modify and develop 
‘products’ allowing for a better risk management and threat assessment in the 
context of precautionary and anticipatory attitudes towards EU security 
governance. 
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Introduction 
 
EU internal security policy has been in recent years progressively focused on 
prevention of threats and risks. The 2010 Internal Security Strategy for the EU 
highlighted the need for ‘prevention and anticipation’ conceived as a proactive 
intelligence-led approach to EU internal security. The long history of terrorist 
activities and explosions of violence in Europe has taught the state authorities and 
societies that preventing surprise attacks requires substantial forecasting and 
should be the main task of intelligence services. 
The persistence of organised crime in different forms produces constant 
threat to security and prosperity of EU citizens. Global networks and 
communication systems facilitate proliferation of risks which are no longer 
confined geographically. In these circumstances security policies formulated, 
arranged and performed by the governments and supranational institutions are 
increasingly concentrated on detection, identification and deactivation of potential 
and immediate threats in order to safeguard the public space through the 
mechanisms of early warning, prevention and anticipation. 
In the face of the growing belief in technologies of surveillance and control 
and the feeling of helplessness of traditional human-based methods of maintaining 
public order, the broadening application of the concept of intelligence is a feature 
of today’s world. Obviously enough, it raises protests and criticism on the part of 
mainstream intelligence officials and scholars who are afraid of the overload of 
information, declining standards of intelligence activities, the widening margins of 
error in intelligence analysis, and even devastating effects for decisionmaking and 
democratic governance (Agrell 2002). This also gives rise to concerns regarding 
fundamental rights, citizens’ freedoms and civil liberties. In the debate on the 
relationship between liberty and security, most often focused on the price that 
contemporary societies have to pay in exchange of the protective shield set by 
their states (Anderson and Apap 2002; Waldron 2003; Berman 2004; Solove 2004, 
2011; Balzacq and Carrera 2006; Huysmans 2006; Northouse 2006; Bigo and 
Tsoukala 2008; Meisels 2008; Bobbitt 2008, Aradau 2008), the dilemma of how 
government may govern and intervene in our future society is of particular 
relevance. This question is fundamental to risk assessment, crime prevention or 
counter-terrorism, and it has acquired the growing importance in the crafting of 
methodology for the study of contemporary security governance. 
The apparent dichotomy ‘liberty vs security’ also encouraged reflection on 
the temporal dimension of security, especially in its future tense or in the 
perspective of threats to come and chances to avoid them. All in all, the core 
element of the ongoing discussion was the selection and identification of the most 
probable among abstract risks and dispersed threats, and the profiling, or sorting 
2 
 
out, of particular social groups or individuals posing presumably imminent threats. 
In terms of security governance, it has to involve specific modes, techniques and 
tools of data processing and knowledge management in the context of precaution 
and anticipation. This led, almost naturally, to the thinking about security as a 
process of active prevention of criminal offences from being committed and the 
preemption of terrorist attacks and other serious criminal acts or imminent 
evidences of military activities and hostilities before they take place (Litwak 2002-
03; Kegley and Raymond 2003; Blinken 2003-04; Feinstein and Slaughter 2004; Lee 
2004; Luban 2004; Ackerman 2006; Daalder 2007; Shue and Rodin 2007; Bzostek 
2008; Amoore and De Goede 2008; Guiora 2008). This is how the pre-crime 
approach was born. 
A pre-crime framework has already been applied in fields like security 
studies (McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Mythen and Walklate 2010; De Goede 2008, 
2011; Aradau and van Munster 2012; Bigo 2012), police science (Kölbel and Selter 
2010; van Brakel and De Hert 2011), criminology (Fitzgibbon 2004; Hebenton and 
Seddon 2009; Zedner, 2007, 2010; Botterhuis, van der Duin, de Ruijter and van 
Wijck 2010), public policy (Jablonowski 2006; Fuerth 2009; DeLeo 2010), economics 
(Glenn 2013), ethics (Krahn, Fenton and Meynell 2010), political philosophy (Poli 
2010), political sociology (Huiskamp 2004; Aradau and van Munster 2011), cultural 
studies (Cooper 2006; Grusin 2010) and human geography (Weber 2005; Anderson 
2010a, 2010b; Wortley and McFarlane 2011; Adey and Anderson 2012). Such a 
widespread application of this concept may be owing to its inherent explanatory 
power, especially with regard to the tendency of shifting the horizon of 
insecurity and uncertainty as far away as possible from agents responsible for law, 
order, and security. In a similar vein, the pre-crime approach may be deployed in 
the face of security threats, which must be countered before a crisis occurs, due to 
their substantial gravity and large-scale effects. This also applies in the form of a 
'what-if' scenario before a crisis occurs or before a crime is committed, and the 
danger to state and society has materialised. Both of these uses in the field of 
security studies have a common root: a political responsibility for protecting the 
populace must be maintained for the longest period possible, in order to minimise 
the ‘post-crime’ costs of public insecurity, crisis management and criminal 
proceedings. 
EU internal security governance, measured by the legitimacy and efficiency 
of means, instruments, methods and techniques involved in it, has increasingly 
depended on the capability of decision makers at both the EU and national levels 
to utilize the pre-crime approach for maximum effect. As Ericson wrote, ‘There is 
also a new sanctioning of responsibilities which escapes reference to anything but 
uncertainty: as the person responsible for precautionary measures, the designated 
agent is judged not only by what she should known but also by what she should 
have expected’ (Ericson 2007, 24). Thus, the relevance of pre-crime has political 
origins, given that it stems from a growing tension between the state’s limited 
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security capabilities and society’s ‘maximum security’ needs and demands. The 
effect of such reasoning was to recognise that both prediction and risk 
management are entirely feasible and objective (Zedner 2007, 267-68). Apparently, 
it seemed to be a technical and organizational matter how to extract elements of 
threats, risks, perils and hazards from the continuously emerging security 
landscape. 
Techniques and practices which incorporate pro-active, pre-emptive 
elements have been noted in criminal justice for decades. Nevertheless, their 
widespread presence in policing, security governance, civil protection and forensics 
is largely a phenomenon of recent times. The rapid development of technologies 
and tools which allow for virtually planning security, such as the simulation of 
credible threats, risk assessment, criminal profiling and the ‘stealth’ management 
of identity, has accelerated and facilitated the search for solutions linking 
prevention to prediction and pre-mediation (Carroll-Mayer, Fairweather and Stahl 
2008; Hildebrandt and Gutwirth 2008; Neyland 2009; Bohm and Mason 2010; 
Gutwirth, Poullet and De Hert 2010. This ‘precautionary logic’ (Ericson 2007, 21-
24) inevitably led to increasing involvement of the state security apparatus in 
threat assessment, early warning systems, and intelligence gathering. The pre-
crime approach was associated with a capacity for ‘accurately predicting threats 
through intelligence rel[ying] on accurate information on the variables associated 
with increased threat’ (McCulloch and Pickering 2009, 635). 
The application of intelligence in the area of internal security, home affairs 
and criminal justice raises certain methodological reservations. There is a need for 
a practical and comprehensive conceptualization of intelligence which could be 
applicable to both internal security and law enforcement and thereby validate 
feasibility of the pre-crime framework for analysis adopted in this paper. Criminal 
intelligence analysis is a concept which seems to match intrinsic features of the 
twenty-first-century global organized criminal structures. Moreover, this concept 
was formulated by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime as a tool for intelligence 
analysts and experts on criminal information and intelligence databases (UNODC 
2011). It permits law enforcement services to elicit a pro-active response to 
threats and risks posed by organized criminal activities. The steps taken in the past 
years by the European Union institutions and agencies, especially the European 
Council and the Council, as well as Europol and Frontex, definitely lead towards 
intelligence-led policing, pro-active law enforcement and intelligence-driven 
situation assessment. Criminal intelligence analysis underpins EU internal security 
governance in terms of acquiring a knowledge and foreknowledge about threats, 
challenges, risks and working out long-term solutions to tackle them in the most 
effective way. 
This paper also inserts the concept of intelligence tradecraft into the pre-
crime analytical framework and verify the usefulness of such an approach to the 
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study of EU internal security governance. The paper will focus on ‘intelligence 
process’ and ‘intelligence product’, i.e. how the stakeholders of EU internal 
security policy construct, modify and develop ‘products’ allowing for a better risk 
analysis and threat assessment in the context of precautionary and anticipatory 
attitudes towards EU security governance. In the case of EU internal security, 
intelligence tradecraft, conceived as organizational capability enabling the 
emergence of synergies between EU agencies and bodies involved in information 
gathering, processing and exchange, is an important factor determining success or 
failure of security governance. 
The thesis developed in this paper is that a pre-crime approach, built on 
enhanced prevention and effective anticipation achieved through horizontal 
coordination at the EU level, needs a tailor-made genuine intelligence tradecraft. 
This is a prerequisite to the development and reinforcement of a legitimate, 
effective and prospective model of internal security governance in the EU. 
Consequently, an EU intelligence tradecraft should be put into practice in order to 
consolidate the Union as an accountable ‘security provider’. Hitherto activities 
taken by EU institutions and agencies as well as the Member States have shown that 
knowledge management, data processing and intelligence analysis are still the 
domain of national agencies although the EU has confirmed its increasing 
capabilities in this area. The choice of a pre-crime framework is a strategically 
motivated option exercised at EU level as a subsidiary mechanism with regard to 
enhanced, technologically driven surveillance and control by national security and 
law enforcement services. It is followed by the development and improvement of 
methods, instruments and skills making up the EU criminal intelligence tradecraft. 
The sections of the paper proceed as follows: In section one, the concept of 
intelligence tradecraft is explained and synthesised on the basis of mainstream 
intelligence literature. Next, the shift in EU internal security policy to an 
anticipatory approach, is explained as a necessary exposition of legal and 
institutional prerequisites for creating a pre-crime framework. This section also 
highlights preventive aspects of security strategies and political guidelines. Section 
three presents EU criminal intelligence model as a part of an EU-wide policy cycle 
for organised and serious international crime. Section four discusses risk analysis 
model on the example of Frontex. Next section elaborates on threat assessment 
methodology, particularly that adopted by Europol in the framework of the serious 
and organised crime threat assessment. The  conclusions focus on the argument 
that the European Union has to develop and proliferate a common intelligence 
tradecraft in order to strengthen the pre-crime approach within a model of security 
governance due to the relative weakness of alternative solutions available at the 
EU level of cooperation in the field of internal security. 
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What is intelligence tradecraft? 
 
In the study of intelligence, the notion of ‘tradecraft’ is applied to describe 
the way in which intelligence becomes a commodity exchanged between agencies 
in order to gain a competitive advantage. According to a strict definition of 
“tradecraft”, it is referred  to “the techniques of the espionage trade, or the 
methods by which an agency involved in espionage conducts its business.”  (Lemer 
and Lemer 2004, 167). Tradecraft may be also conceived as a skill-set necessary for 
acquiring information and converting it into intelligence. 
The traditional notion of tradecraft was associated with “the ways in which 
an intelligence officer arranged to make contact with an agent, the means by 
which the agent passed on information to the officer, the method for paying the 
agent, and the many precautions and tactics of deception applied along the way” 
(Lemer and Lemer 2004, 167). 
Nowadays the craft of intelligence has to take into account the change in 
targets of intelligence – from states (mostly global and regional powers) and 
international governmental organizations to non-state actors, terrorist 
organizations, transnational criminal networks (Treverton 2009, 15-16). In the face 
of present-day problems, challenges and threats, tradecraft seeks to combine 
classical methods that an intelligence officer (agent, expert, analyst) uses in the 
performance of  his or her duties with technologically-driven knowledge 
management tools making use of sophisticated machinery. Tradecraft then is a 
combination of individual abilities, talents and skills as well as common sense, 
experience and hunch with norms, procedures, guidelines, methods, organizational 
structures and – last but not least – technical and financial capabilities. The two 
dimensions of tradecraft: subjective and objective, correspond with another 
division. Tradecraft  may be also considered in two aspects: operational and 
analytical. The former puts emphasis on practical skills and abilities to convert 
available information and data into tactical intelligence and translate intelligence 
products into operational support stuff. The latter refers to the ability of 
processing raw information and available data along strategic guidelines and 
generalizations that will support and stimulate the performance of intelligence 
services. 
The craft of intelligence is expressed in the intelligence process that 
produces insights for policymaking. Any intelligence tradecraft is subject to a 
model of sequential activities allowing for a systemic, comprehensive and logical 
gathering and processing of information and data. The so-called intelligence cycle 
stimulates specific cognitive attitudes and behaviours in intelligence officers that 
have a direct impact on quality and quantity of intelligence products. It also puts a 
kind of order into the whole inventory of methods, techniques and state-of-the-art 
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technologies used to produce intelligence. The intelligence cycle is a process of 
developing raw information and unrefined data into finished intelligence for the 
use of the authorized customers (policymakers). Writ large, it includes tasking, 
collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. It starts with 
identifying customer needs. On the basis of these requirements, planning and 
direction is made in order to manage effectively the entire cycle. The next step is 
collection and acquisition of information and data from variegated sources. Then 
processing and exploitation takes place and consists in converting the vast amount 
of information collected into a form usable by analysts.  The next stage refers to 
analysis, evaluation and integration of available data with the aim of preparing  
finished intelligence products. Finally, at dissemination stage, intelligence products 
reach the consumers whose started the cycle. Quite often, ‘soft’ intelligence 
products, devoid of confidential or restricted information, are made available to 
the public as a way to raise its awareness and stimulate resilience to the identified 
threats (Steele 2002; Xu 2007; George 2008; Lowenthal 2008). 
At every stage of the intelligence cycle, the tradecraft has to take into 
account the disciplines of intelligence. This is important for technical and 
organizational reasons, since every discipline requires specific elements of the 
craft of intelligence and delivers specific input to the cycle of intelligence analysis. 
Human intelligence (HUMINT) relies on interpersonal contacts, be it open or covert, 
conducive to certain information in possession of a person or a group of persons. 
Signal intelligence (SIGINT) involves remote acquiring and transmission of 
information and data through technologically advances high-capacity electronic 
devices. Imaginery intelligence (IMINT) consists in obtaining and processing of 
photographs and other types of  imagery. Measurement and signature intelligence 
(MASINT) is an analysis of physical attributes of certain objects, or targets, 
facilitating subsequent identification and/or measurement of these objects. Open-
source intelligence (OSINT), growing in popularity and utility, refers to a broad 
array of information and sources that are generally available, including information 
obtained from the media, professional and academic records, and publicly 
available data. Social media intelligence (SOCMINT) is a relatively new discipline, 
responding to the rapid virtualization of social communication and the expansion of 
cyberspace. SOCMINT is intelligence derived from social media through scanning, 
measurement and analysis of information shared by the users of these media 
(Steele 2002, 18-21; Richelson 2012; Omand, Bartlett and Miller 2012). 
In every one of the above mentioned disciplines, intelligence analysis is the 
core of the tradecraft. Analytical tradecraft is the term used to describe the 
principles and tools used by analysts to instill rigour in their thinking and prevent 
cognitive biases from skewing their analytic judgments. Through the use of 
structured analytic techniques, analysts make their argumentation and logic more 
transparent and subject to further investigation. In analysis, tradecraft comprises 
the cognitive and methodological tools and techniques used by analysts to gather 
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and organize data, interpret their meaning, and produce judgments, insights and 
forecasts for policymakers and other users of finished intelligence products. 
Analytic performance is an indicator, a sort of litmus test, for the whole 
intelligence community as the provider of insights, anticipatory and preventive 
guidelines. When effective and successful, it consolidates the analytical tradecraft, 
validates the intelligence cycle and legitimises the entire analytic community. In 
case of mistakes or failures, it triggers off a chain of substantial changes affective 
the whole tradecraft practiced by the intelligence community. Johnston observed 
that: ‘The adoption of the word “tradecraft” demonstrates the analytic 
community’s need to create a professional identity separate and unique from other 
disciplines but tied directly to the perceived prestige and cachet of intelligence 
operations’ (Johnston 2005, 18). 
The focus on analysis and production of intelligence gives up the traditional 
feature of intelligence tradecraft as the set of methods, skills and instruments 
implemented in operations rather than analytic work (Johnston 2005, 17). 
However, recent changes in intelligence theory and practice suggest the increasing 
role of analytical aspects and cognitive abilities of individuals participating in the 
intelligence cycle. ‘Software’ instead of ‘hardware’ predominates nowadays the 
craft of intelligence. Failures noticed in recent years proved that intelligence 
community awash in data acquired by intelligence machinery may feel exposed to 
the risk of overload and pressure from customers awaiting tailor-made solutions to 
the identified security dilemmas. The syndrome of ‘big data’ flowing into every 
area of the globe is perceived as a source of escalating problems and dilemmas of 
political, technical, financial, organizational, legal and ethical nature.  
Therefore, the future orientation in intelligence tradecraft is analysis-
centric instead of collection-centric (Treverton and Gabbard 2008, 44). However, 
both approaches should be well balanced and tied by synergetic connections. This 
is a demanding task for governments, national intelligence communities and 
transnational institutions and agencies. The case of the European Union is no 
exception. 
 
Strategic Dimension of the Pre-Crime Approach to EU Internal Security 
 
Given its responsibility for providing security for both individual states as 
well as citizens within the area of freedom, security, and justice, the European 
Union has been attempting to formulate a viable and cogent response towards the 
security challenges facing its Members since the end of the 20th century. In the 
wake of the tragic events of 11 September 2001, counterterrorism policy began to 
occupy almost the entire agenda for cooperation within the EU Justice and Home 
Affairs (Winn 2003, 154-155; Occhipinti 2003; Wiener 2008; Friedrichs 2008; Deflem 
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2010; Argomaniz 2011). Despite this change in focus, however, the activities of EU 
institutions and Member States were still following intergovernmental 
arrangements, focused on a reactive approach to threat management which 
underlined its limited preventive capabilities. In effect, decades of confrontation 
with various forms of terrorism experienced by several Member States gave rise to 
practices and patterns which effectively precluded an anticipatory intervention at 
the EU level. 
Developments in EU internal security policy during the aftermath of the 2004 
Madrid terrorist attack fell short of the expectations held by the leading EU 
Member States (Kaunert 2010; Bures 2011). Security policies and strategies which 
were formulated, arranged and performed by several governments were 
increasingly concentrated on detection, identification and ultimately, the 
deactivation of both immediate and potential threats in order to protect the public 
arena through the mechanisms of early warning, prevention and anticipation. 
These strategies were consistent with the nation-centric preventive approach 
defined by the 2004 Declaration on Combating Terrorism, the 2004 Hague 
Programme and the package of counterterrorist strategies adopted in late 2005 
(with EU Counter-Terrorism strategy as a core). 
Elements of the pre-crime approach were most clearly identified in the 
Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. Adopted as a 
separate document, it aimed to prevent individuals from turning to terrorism and 
to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging. It proposed disrupting the 
recruitment activities of both individual and group actors for the purpose of 
terrorism, to engage in a dialogue with Muslim communities in order to promote 
moderate voices prevailing over extremist ones, and to promote security, justice 
and opportunity for all (Council of the EU 2005a, 1). With regard to the practical 
motives of emphasizing these preventative characteristics, the strategy utilized 
community policing and effective monitoring of the Internet, as well as people 
travelling to and within identified conflict zones. At the EU level, this strategy 
called for traditional goals, such as increased coordination of national policies, 
information sharing, as well as planning and exchanging good practices (Bossong 
2008; Gruszczak 2008, Coolsaet 2010). Due to the conservative nature of the 
document, however, the methods and means defined in that document did not 
allow for a breakthrough in the general approach to terrorism and other risks to EU 
internal security.  
Protracted and inconclusive work on new legislative proposals intended to 
strengthen cooperation in EU security policy eventually led to the fragmentation of 
prospective cooperation in home affairs. The G5 group established in 2003 by the 
five largest and most influential EU Member States - Germany, France, the UK, 
Italy and Spain - aspired to leadership in this field by providing a decision-making 
forum outside the framework of the EU. In May 2005, seven of the EU Member 
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States concluded the Prüm Treaty on the need to step up cross-border cooperation, 
particularly for the purpose of combating terrorism, as well as cross-border crime 
and illegal migration. The document envisaged a mutual exchange of information 
extracted from criminal records through the automated searching and comparison 
of DNA profiles, fingerprint data, vehicle registration data as well as information on 
terrorist subjects and illegal migration (Council of the EU 2005b; Balzacq et al. 
2006; Bellanova 2008).  
The spectre of a polycentric internal security governance for the EU, which 
would dilute its ultimate effectiveness, did not come to pass due to the policy shift 
of the leading EU member states towards a pro-Union stance regarding the 
prospects for a robust, efficient and firm strategy responding to the needs of policy 
planning and strategic guidelines in the field of internal security. The beginning of 
conceptual works on the next multiannual programme for the EU’s area of 
freedom, security and justice and the establishment of a high-level advisory group 
on the future of European home affairs policy, (the so-called Future Group) 
allowed to orientate the dispersed views and perspectives towards coming 
imminent and inevitable challenges and tasks. 
The Future Group’s contribution to the debate on EU internal security was 
important, in particular because it stimulated a proactive approach and a much 
bolder attitude towards utilizing modern means and tools for the dual purposes of 
precaution and early warning. The Group recommended both closer cooperation 
between police and intelligence services in the Member States, and a guarantee of 
increased synergy between law enforcement agencies on a national level, possibly 
through networking and transnational workflow (Bizjak 2009). Furthermore, the 
Group suggested that EU agencies such as Europol and Eurojust, as well as the Joint 
Situation Centre (SitCen), should be strengthened and better positioned  to serve 
Member States with regard to the exchange of intelligence (Future Group 2008a, 5; 
2008b). 
The Future Group was established in order to formulate a general approach 
towards a new vision of upcoming projects held in the subsequent multi-annual 
programme of developing the EU area of freedom, security and justice. This 
programme was prepared by the Swedish EU Presidency and subsequently adopted 
by the European Council in mid-December 2009, just after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The Stockholm Program: An Open and Secure Europe Serving the 
Citizen (European Council 2010) put a proper emphasis on prevention and control. 
Moreover, one can notice an evidently anticipatory approach.  
‘The best way to reduce the level of crime is to take effective measures to 
prevent them from ever occurring [emph. added], including promoting social
 inclusion, by using a multidisciplinary approach which also includes 
taking administrative measures and promoting cooperation between 
administrative authorities, citizens of the Union that have similar 
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experiences and are affected in similar ways by crime and related insecurity 
in their everyday lives’ (European Council 2010, 20).  
In summary, while the prevention and deterrence of threats was important, 
disaster prevention through reducing the states' vulnerability to these events by 
developing a strategic approach, improving preparedness and increasing the 
effectiveness of potential responses were to be of equal value. These anticipatory 
elements reveal themselves in those parts of the document dedicated to the 
prevention of criminal acts. The Commission was tasked with assessing whether the 
networking of criminal records made it possible to prevent criminal offences from 
being committed; for example, through background checks to determine access to 
certain jobs, and whether it is possible to extend the exchange of information of 
these supervision measures (European Council 2010, 19). 
The Stockholm Programme granted the necessary political authorization for 
a comprehensive strategic approach to internal security, which allowed for the 
enhancement of actions at the European level, combined with better coordination 
at the national level; the ambitions and intentions of EU institutions were to be 
reconciled with national sovereign interests (Brown 2011, 485-487). The European 
Council called upon the Council and the Commission to define an internal security 
strategy for the Union based on the principle of clarity regarding the specific 
division of tasks between the EU and the Member States. This includes stringent 
cooperation between Union agencies, which includes further improvement of 
information exchange, as well as the use of regional initiatives and cooperation 
schemes, and a horizontal approach in order to face complex crises and disasters 
(Buono 2009; Kaunert and Léonard 2010). 
Nevertheless, the Stockholm Programme explicitly stated that a proactive 
approach is one of the basic elements of any future strategy for crime prevention. 
The Programme reflected on the necessity of a proactive and intelligence-led 
approach, as well as a focus on implementation and streamlining; the participants 
felt that preventative action deserved particular attention as an essential 
background for the eventual political declaration, which would signal a significant 
shift in the hitherto reactive EU internal security policy. Other provisions 
incorporated into the Programme regarding the adoption of this type of internal 
security strategy naturally met with an immediate reaction from the Spanish 
government, who were also preparing to take over the Council Presidency. Spain 
presented a draft of the new EU Internal Security Strategy (EUISS) already at the 
end of December 2009 in Madrid, and after having cleared intense scrutiny it was 
adopted by the EU Council in February 2010. 
The changes to the existing strategies were to be extensive, as showcased in 
the following excerpt:  
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‘Among the main objectives of the Internal Security Strategy for the EU are 
the prevention and anticipation of crime as well as of natural and man-made 
disasters, and the mitigation of their potential impact. Whilst effective 
prosecution of the perpetrators of a crime remains essential, a stronger 
focus on the prevention of criminal acts and terrorist attacks before they 
take place can help reduce the consequent human or psychological damage 
which is often irreparable. Our strategy must therefore emphasise 
prevention and anticipation, which is based on a proactive and intelligence-
led approach as well as procuring the evidence required for prosecution’ 
(Council of the EU 2010a, 11).  
 
As a result of these changes, the arsenal of preventive, anticipatory and 
intelligence-based measures became quite impressive: analytical tools, early-
warning systems, data pooling, systems of recording and transfer of sensitive data, 
risk analysis and capacity planning. According to the EUISS, 
‘This allows us to deepen our understanding of the different types of threats 
and their probability and to anticipate what might happen, so that we are 
not only prepared for the outcomes of future threats but also able to 
establish mechanisms to detect them and prevent their happening in the 
first place. For this reason, a comprehensive approach must be taken that is 
geared to constant detection and prevention of the threats and risks facing 
the EU in the various areas of internal security, and the main issues of 
concern to the public’ (Council of the EU 2010a, 11).  
 
The organisational framework regarding the enforcement of the principles, 
as well as the objectives of the EUISS, also appears to be innovative, at least to a 
certain extent. As a result, EU institutions and agencies that had already been 
reformed by the Lisbon Treaty and further strengthened on new legal grounds 
(especially in the case of Europol), obtained additional support on the part of the 
newly established Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI). 
As designed, the EUISS became a linchpin for a new model of internal 
security governance, one that is based on a more integrated approach tackling both 
the source and root causes of threats, risks and insecurity and not solely addressing 
the consequent effects and negative outcomes. In practical terms, the strategy’s 
pre-crime objectives were met through a reinvigoration of the information 
exchange existing between law enforcement authorities in the Member States. This 
system also takes advantage of existing EU databases as well as improved 
operational cooperation between the EU's internal security agencies and bodies, 
such as Europol, Cepol, Eurojust and Frontex, and ensuring stringent coordination 
between them by the COSI. 
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In a follow-up of the EU Internal Security Strategy, the Belgian Presidency 
launched a project in 2011 which aimed to link the various national strategies of 
the Member States with political decisions at the EU level to create an effective 
way of operational activities between EU agencies and national law enforcement 
services. It crafted the Harmony Project in close cooperation with Europol, as well 
as the UK and the Netherlands, because of their experience in intelligence-led 
policing, so as to develop an integrated EU approach to crime prevention and 
combating terrorism through a comprehensive threat assessment and on this basis 
as an intelligence-led cooperation in action (Belgian Federal Police 2010). 
The project envisioned linking all the requisite organizations within a 
horizontal approach, which would result in a better alignment between the 
activities of the EU agencies and combined with a vertical approach, meaning that 
the Member States could avail themselves of the opportunity to integrate EU tools 
and measures into their national strategies and policies. As a result, a genuine 
European policy cycle could be established on the grounds of the already existing 
EU instruments, policies and actions. In April 2010, a seminar was held in order to 
discuss the core concept and principles of a European policy cycle model. Those 
assembled at the seminar recognized that there was a need to further develop a 
coherent policy cycle on the basis of an intelligence-led policing approach. The 
Council at a meeting in Brussels on 8 and 9 November 2010 adopted conclusions on 
the creation and implementation of an EU-wide policy cycle for organised and 
serious international crime on the basis of a new ‘intelligence product’: the 
European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (Council of the EU 
2010b) .  
Next years have shown, however, that the initial impetus for a 
comprehensive internal security governance in the EU was lost. Likewise, the pre-
crime approach has been limited to certain elements of policy cycle, most of all 
criminal intelligence, risk analysis and threat assessments. These issues are 
elaborated in the remainder of this paper. 
 
EU Criminal Intelligence Model 
 
EU security policy has acquired a multidimensional character in the past decade, 
due to new forms of emerging threats and challenges as well as varied types of 
response. The levels of EU security policy differed in many respects, subject to 
issues, areas, methods, tools and policies applied to cope with detected or 
identified problems. Approaches worked out for the effective operation in 
particular fields of security were aiming to tackle any single issue in a specific 
manner, giving thus opportunity for EU institutions and agencies to intervene in 
political, economic,  diplomatic, or even military way. Before 9/11, however, EU 
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justice and home affairs cooperation, despite its reinforcement as a result of the 
1999 Amsterdam reform of EU treaty law, was relatively loose and dependent on 
Member States’ particular interests or national determinants. Intergovernmental 
arrangements and EU secondary legal instruments constituted a general framework 
for internal security policy yet left inside a vast area of variegated activities by 
Member States focused on narrowly defined national interests and local perception 
of security problems and challenges.  
The events of 9/11 highlighted the critical importance of intelligence for 
effective prevention and combating of terrorism and transnational crime. However, 
it did not have any special impact on the capabilities of EU legal and institutional 
arrangements to establish a genuine intelligence-led policing model. Some 
attempts at intensifying and enlarging the scope of intelligence cooperation at EU 
level, due to the lack of unanimity and the deficit of trust among the Member 
States, did not yield the expected results (Bures 2006, 62-63; Müler-Wille 2006; 
Duke 2006, 619-620). 
This picture altered in the immediate aftermaths of the 11 March 2004 
terrorist attack in Madrid.  The EU’s institutions placed particular emphasis on the 
exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of 
the Member States and called for the improvement of mechanisms for cooperation 
and the promotion of effective systematic collaboration between police, security 
and intelligence services. The European Council in the Hague Programme of 
November 2004 set the goal of ‘setting up and implementing a methodology for 
intelligence-led law enforcement at EU level.’ (European Council 2004, 9). A British 
proposal submitted to Interior Ministers gathered at an informal meeting in 
September 2005 contained what may have been considered the ‘missing link’ in the 
creation of a potential EU intelligence tradecraft. A consultation paper delivered 
by the UK Home Office introduced the idea of a European Criminal Intelligence 
Model (ECIM) based on the principles of intelligence-led policing and evidently 
inspired by the UK’s National Intelligence Model (UK Presidency 2005, 1). According 
to the UK Presidency, an ECIM should benefit EU Member States by: 
– improving knowledge of serious and organised crime through more 
effective collection, exchange, and analysis of information; 
– increasing the effectiveness of Europol and other relevant EU bodies; 
– achieving better operational results; 
– allowing all Member States as well as EU institutions to observe a 
common methodology for tackling serious and organised crime in the 
EU (UK Presidency 2005, 1). 
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The ECIM  was marked by a ‘shift from reactive policing to a problem solving 
approach, based on analysis, by developing action plans (focused on crime 
prevention as well as on repressive action) and involving multiple actors (both 
private and public partners)’ (Council of the EU 2010c, 8). According to Brady, ‘the 
ECIM sets out how the EU can achieve this by ensuring national police forces, 
Europol’s criminal intelligence analysts and the police chiefs’ operations work 
together against the same criminal threats’ (Brady 2008, 106). Intelligence-led 
policing principles which were the critical underpinning for the ECIM, were based 
on the assumption that EU agencies and institutions in strict cooperation with the 
Member States must first improve its knowledge of various aspects of cross-border 
and international criminality, while also developing an intelligence cycle leading to 
strengthened and accurate operational capabilities (Nunzi 2007, 148). 
Europol was pointed as the ‘central EU capability to receive, store and 
analyse this collected information’ and to support operational activities of the 
Member States based on Europol’s earlier strategic assessments. However, the 
eventual application of the ECIM was predetermined by Europol’s capabilities, 
which had been reduced by legal provisions and organisational schemes, as well as 
the inability of the Member States to exercise a joint will or exhibit an openness 
for advanced cooperation in the exchange of information and intelligence in the 
area of transnational criminal justice. The Hague Programme formulated a 
prospective solution to the challenge of granting mutual access to criminal 
intelligence data stored in the individual databases of the Member States, based on 
the principle of availability, but it collapsed in the face of the inherent 
bureaucratic inflexibility within the decision-making process at the EU level. While 
in December 2006 the Council finally adopted, on the initiative of Sweden, the 
framework decision on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence 
between law enforcement authorities of EU Member States, it neither significantly 
improved the efficiency of information exchange system in the EU, nor did it 
contribute to the feasibility of the ECIM. Furthermore, the availability of police 
data and intelligence was subject to numerous regulations, rules and working 
arrangements set on national, legal and political grounds (Bigo 2006; Elsen 2007). 
Given the clear lack of confidence among law enforcement agencies, and the 
constant deficit of trust for Europol and Eurojust, in the end flexible and efficient 
prevention was hardly viable at the EU level. Instead, it followed other 
intergovernmental channels and arrangements, both formal and informal 
(Gruszczak 2009, 93-94). 
Europol, on the basis of the new Decision adopted in April 2009, was 
endowed with enhanced capabilities in the area of information management, 
intelligence production and sharing, as well as operational support for the Member 
States. Europol’s strategy for the period 2010-2014 assigned this entity the role of  
EU criminal information hub and the  centre for law enforcement expertise. 
Europol should also support law enforcement operations in the Member States, 
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mostly through the delivery of analysis and intelligence. Europol was also tasked to 
lead the further development of the ECIM. In this regard, it should develop a 
common EU approach for targeted collection and sharing of key criminal 
information, integrated analysis of financial intelligence linked to all crime 
phenomena, identification of top criminal targets. It should also improve and 
strengthen the OCTA methodology and promote ECIM principles among national 
authorities in the Member States as well as EU institutions and agencies (Europol 
2009). 
The European Criminal Intelligence Model is based on the assumption that 
the tasking and co-ordination processes at EU level should be fully dependent on 
the key intelligence products conceived as the ‘deliverables’ by which intelligence-
led policing can be implemented. These key intelligence products included 
strategic assessments, tactical assessments, risk analyses and problem profiles. All 
intelligence work should be supported by the knowledge products and system 
products as elements that provide quality assurance to the ECIM. In this regard, the 
functioning of international co-operation and liaison arrangements, including 
Europol, was meant to provide support for analysis of terrorism and organised 
crime. 
 
Risk Analysis Model 
 
Risk analysis is a widely used tool to understand problems and identify 
challenges and hazards in many areas of contemporary life, especially under 
conditions of uncertainty (Frenkel, Hommel and Rudolf 2005; Jablonowski 2006; 
Power 2007; Vellani 2007; Yoe 2012). With respect to security, risk assessment is 
one of the foundational skills developed by analysts, experts and decision-makers 
because it estimates the probabilities of exposure to certain threats and hazards, 
helps to anticipate problems before they result in an irreversible breakdown and is 
a basis for appropriate countermeasure options  (Löfstedt 2005; Jablonowski 2006; 
Norman 2010). 
EU internal security governance has been progressively determined by skills, 
measures and technologies employed to estimate the identified sources and types 
of risk, assess the probability of its appearance and work out appropriate solutions 
at EU level. While criminal intelligence focused on serious threats generated by 
domestic and transnational organized groups, risk analysis is more oriented to 
“soft” threats, which do not bring about an explosive situation undermining the 
foundations of public order, rule of law or state authority but may produce long-
term negative consequences for systemic stability, public accountability and 
reliability of state institutions. One can say that criminal intelligence addresses the 
problem of legal order while risk analysis is referred to societal trust and 
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legitimacy of state authority. Generally, risk analysis responds to certain needs of 
EU institutions and agencies with respect to ideological, legal, human and systemic 
prerequisites of freedom, security and justice in the European Union. Most of all, 
risk analysis serves to identify “precautionary regions”, or “danger zones” 
(Jablonowski 2006, 42-43), reduce uncertainty and contribute to effective solutions 
adopted by EU institutions or agencies. 
For decades, migration has exerted a huge impact on European societies, 
economies and – last but not least - identity. According to Eurostat, as of 1 January 
2012 there were 33 million foreigners living in the EU (6.5 per cent of the total 
population). Of these, 20.7 million are citizens of non-EU countries (Eurostat 2013). 
The illegal foreign resident population in the EU is estimated at 1.9 to 3.8 million 
in 2008. Some sources claim the number of irregular migrants is 2.8-6 million or 
even up to 8 million (CLANDESTINO 2009).  Over half of illegal immigrants entered 
the EU legally but became illegal due to overstay (European Commission 2008, 2-3). 
In 2010 540,000 illegal immigrants were apprehended in the EU but only 226 000 
(around 40 per cent) of these were effectively removed (European Commission 
2011, 4). The European Union, with 500 million inhabitants, over 42,000 km of 
coastline, almost 9,000 km of land borders and approximately 1800 border crossing 
points sees every year around 700 million external border crossings. About a third 
of these border crossings are made by third country nationals who are checked at 
the crossing points at EU external borders.  
 Obviously enough, EU external borderlands have been one of the most 
sensitive “precautionary areas” for EU Member States and its citizens for they were 
highly exposed to illegal migration and unfounded asylum seeking. The fear of 
increasing migratory pressure and accumulation of asylum application underpinned 
the development of immigration and asylum legal inventory as well as the building 
up of an integrated border management system aiming to reinforce the EU’s 
“external shield” and reduce probability of risk-prone transfers of persons and 
goods into the territory of the Member States. One of the elements of exclusionary 
approach to immigration and asylum was the establishment of Frontex – an EU 
agency for the management of operational cooperation at EU external borders. 
According to Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing Frontex, amended 
in October 2011 (Council of the EU 2004; Council of the EU 2011), this agency 
facilitates and renders more effective the application of existing and future Union 
measures relating to the management of external borders. The tasks enumerated in 
the above mentioned documents include the carrying out of risk analyses, including 
the assessment of the capacity of Member States to face threats and pressure at 
the external borders, and the participation in the development of research 
relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders. As regards 
information exchange and intelligence analysis, Frontex is responsible for 
developing and operating information systems that enable swift and reliable 
exchanges of information regarding emerging risks at the external borders, as well 
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as providing the necessary assistance to the development and operation of a 
European border surveillance system and, as appropriate, to the development of a 
common information sharing environment, including interoperability of systems. 
More specifically, the agency is assigned to develop and apply a common integrated 
risk analysis model. It prepares both general and tailored risk analyses to be 
submitted to the Council and the Commission. Article 4 of the Council Regulation 
No 2007/2004 stipulates that: ‘For the purpose of risk analysis, the Agency may 
assess, after prior consultation with the Member State(s) concerned, their capacity 
to face upcoming challenges, including present and future threats and pressures at 
the external borders of the European Union, especially for those Member States 
facing specific and disproportionate pressures. To that end, the Agency may assess 
the equipment and the resources of the Member States regarding border control. 
The assessment shall be based on information given by the Member States 
concerned, and on the reports and results of joint operations, pilot projects, rapid 
interventions and other activities of the Agency’ (Council of the EU 2004).  
Given the handful of migration statistical data mentioned above, depicting 
intensity of migratory movements in the EU, the problem of acquiring, processing, 
evaluating and analysing relevant information for intelligence purposes seems to be 
very demanding. Frontex and EU Member States have intended to work out a 
comprehensive solution consisting in the integration of various forms of intelligence 
and risk analysis through interconnected information sources and datasets 
dedicated to the constant or emerging security-related issues. Frontex has been 
granted with certain competences regarding information management. It collates 
data mainly from Member States, which are obliged to provide the Agency with all 
necessary information regarding the situation and possible threats at the external 
borders. In addition, EU bodies as well as public media and other open sources of 
information are taken into consideration. Most importantly, the amended Frontex 
regulation authorises the agency to collect and process personal data of individuals 
who are subject to operational activities conducted or commanded by Frontex, like 
joint return operations, pilot projects and rapid interventions at the external 
borders, in order to contribute to the security of the Member States. Collated 
information, including personal data, is further processed for strategic and 
operational purposes as well as a contribution to the analytical and operational 
work of other EU law enforcement agencies, mainly Europol. 
Risk analysis is the core part of Frontex’s intelligence tradecraft. It fits the 
logic of analysis cycle, being the starting point of all Frontex operational activities 
as well as delivering a picture of the situation at the EU’s external borders, 
contributing to training purposes and responding to the needs of principal 
customers: EU agencies and Member States.  
A framework for risk analysis was created in 2003 and consequently 
developed after the establishment of the Frontex agency. It is called CIRAM - the 
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Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model. It was implemented by the Risk Analysis 
Centre set up in 2003 by EU Member States and served as a tool of strategic 
intelligence used by the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 
(SCIFA) serving the JHA Council of the EU. CIRAM was based on a six-field matrix, 
bringing together elements of criminal intelligence and risk assessment (Carrera 
2007, 15-16). CIRAM was updated in 2011 in order to better respond to the 
changing external environment of the EU, to deal effectively with new types of 
risks and threats and to reflect the legal changes, especially the new Schengen 
Borders Code and the Frontex Regulation, both of which emphasised risk analysis as 
a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources and efficiency of 
equipment (Frontex 2013a, 11).  
Currently CIRAM is characterised by a management approach to risk analysis 
that defines risk as a function of the threat, vulnerability and impact (Frontex 
2013a, 11). It is utilised for strategic and operational purposes. Concerning the 
latter, it supports the coordination of joint operations at the external borders 
conducted or coordinated by Frontex. It provides a background for an overall 
assessment of conditions, determinants and circumstances existing in the area of a 
planned joint operation at EU external borders. This picture is a sort of security 
landscape and is drawn on the basis of vast data flow containing various detailed 
information delivered by operational personnel made available by the Member 
States as well as acquired from public  sources. This type of analysis is focused on 
identifying areas and sources of elevated risk or imminent threats and deciphering 
migratory routes, the main nationalities or countries of origin of migrants as well as 
modi operandi of criminal groups or smuggling networks operating in the area of 
Frontex’s planned activities. 
Operational analytical products are evidently based on a pro-active 
assessment of security environment, including anticipation of threats and hazards 
and early warning. Knowledge management and risk analysis are methods serving to 
build up preparedness and resilience to endemic problems and security challenges 
existing at the external borders. They also underpin strategic analysis, wherein 
CIRAM is orientated to the needs of decision-makers in the Member States, officials 
in EU institutions and agencies, border authorities and international organisations. 
To be effective and reliable in its analytical properties, CIRAM relies on a four-tier 
access control model that involves gathering information from numerous sources 
dispersed over the territory of EU member states. To this end, the Frontex Risk 
Analysis Network (FRAN) was established in 2007. It provides the framework for 
sharing knowledge and producing analytical and strategic reports on the current 
state of play at the external borders linking the intelligence networks of individual 
countries with Frontex (Frontex 2013b). The cooperative framework of the FRAN 
and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-
RAN), feeds Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) with data which are processed, 
analysed and disseminated in form of analytical products. The most important are 
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quarterlies, semi-annual and annual risk analyses. Moreover,  RAU issues occasional 
documents and other tailored risk-analysis products. 
Risk analysis  model implemented by Frontex reflects pro-active approach to 
public order and internal security of the EU. Pre-crime perspective addresses not 
only ‘crimes of arrival’, i.e. inflow of irregular migrants seeking refugee status. It 
is mostly dealing with the problem of increasing criminality at EU external borders, 
taking form of transnational organized criminal networks involved in trafficking in 
human beings. This is why Frontex’s methodology combines quantitative risk 
analysis, which relies on mathematical models and techniques to identify, quantify 
and manage exposures, with qualitative risk management, which focuses primarily 
on experience, judgment and common sense. However, the prevalence of 
quantitative data in Frontex’s  analytical tradecraft suggests that the agency is 
focused on ‘hard’ border security issues that could underpin cost-benefit approach 
to EU immigration and asylum policies. This means that the horizon on an emerging 
security landscape is a part of ‘borderwork’ consisting in the performance of 
specific power relations seeking to produce and reproduce a bounded identity of 
‘aliens’ (Hooper 2004, 218; Vaughan-Williams 2008). In this respect, selective 
differentiation at the external borders seeks to facilitate information management 
and enhance risk analysis capabilities of Frontex as well as national risk assessment 
units in the Member States. 
 
Threat Assessment Methodology 
 
Risk analysis and threat assessment are an integral part of the policy cycle  since 
they address the security requirements of the European Union in terms of integrity, 
availability, accountability and confidentiality. Following Vidalis (2003, 5) we 
conceive a threat assessment as a statement of threats that are related to 
vulnerabilities of a given entity and to threat agents (hostile states, terrorist 
groups, criminal organizations, irregular migrants), and also a statement of the 
believed capabilities that those threat agents possess.  Threat assessment is more 
of qualitative nature. It takes into account numerous categories of data delivered 
by authorized stakeholders or extracted from open sources.  
The development of an integrated threat assessment model in the EU was 
restricted by the low level of mutual cooperation in policing and criminal justice, 
differences in national perspectives on security threats and the lack of large-scale 
IT systems enabling secure information exchange.  
As we mentioned above, in 2005 a European Criminal Intelligence Model was 
proposed by the UK. One of its elements was the improvement of knowledge of 
serious and organised crime through more effective collection, exchange, and 
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analysis of information. In parallel, the UK Presidency also submitted to the Council 
draft conclusions on intelligence-led policing and the development of the Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) (Council of the EU 2005c). It was stipulated that 
Europol would be in charge of producing an OCTA in close cooperation with Member 
States obliged to facilitate and instigate the transmission of structured information 
and intelligence in accordance with intelligence requirements prepared by Europol 
and issued through the Heads of Europol National Units.  Europol would also 
communicate that intelligence requirements to EU agencies and bodies and to third 
countries and organisations with which it had co-operation agreements. The 
information and criminal intelligence obtained from the above listed entities 
should be used to produce the OCTA. 
In 2006, the first Organized Crime Threat Assessment was published by 
Europol, replacing the Organized Crime Report prepared annually since 1993. The 
then-Director of Europol, Max-Peter Ratzel, described OCTA as ‘a core product of 
the intelligence-led policing concept’ (Europol 2006, 3). It was pointed out in the 
report that ‘The OCTA, being a forward-looking document, will help 
decisionmakers identify strategic priority areas in the fight against serious and 
organised crime and to initiate an intelligence process to define operational 
targets. By doing so, the OCTA will also support the streamlining of law 
enforcement activities at a European and regional level.’ (Europol 2006, 4). 
Intelligence tradecraft  employed in the OCTA was described in scarce words: ‘The 
OCTA is based on a multi-source approach, including law enforcement and non-law 
enforcement sources. These sources include various European agencies as well as 
the private sector. A specific emphasis is put on elaborating the benefits of an 
intensified public-private partnership.’ (Europol 2006, 4). Methodology was 
Achilles’ heel of those yearly reports and raised criticism on the part of experts and 
practitioners (van Duyne 2007; Zoutendijk 2010). It rose up during the discussion on 
the reinforcement of preventive aspects of EU internal security policy and 
particularly after the adoption of the Internal Security Strategy highlighting 
prevention, anticipation and intelligence-led approach. 
In a follow-up of the EU Internal Security Strategy, a seminar was held in 
April 2010 in order to discuss the core concept and principles of a European policy 
cycle model. Those assembled at the seminar recognised that there was a need to 
further develop a coherent policy cycle on the basis of an intelligence-led policing 
approach. The Council at a meeting in Brussels in November 2010 adopted 
conclusions on the creation and implementation of an EU-wide policy cycle for 
organised and serious international crime on the basis of a new ‘intelligence 
product’: the European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU 
SOCTA) (Council of the EU 2010b).  
The Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment Methodology was 
validated by COSI at its meeting on 25 June 2012 (Council of the EU 2012). It was 
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implemented for the first time in the 2013 organised crime threat assessment 
published by Europol in March 2013 (Europol 2013).  The SOCTA constitutes the 
core part of the EU policy cycle and is deemed necessary for an effective 
implementation of  the intelligence-led approach ensuring that the most relevant 
threats are properly addressed and that analytical products developed and 
launched by appropriate EU agencies directly feed political decision-making in the 
EU. As a result, the methodological work on the new threat assessment in general  
was following the typical intelligence cycle, focusing both on delivery capabilities 
of major contributors (i.e. Europol and member states’ law enforcement services) 
as well as the previously agreed customer requirements. The fundamental feature 
of the SOCTA is its anticipating perspective on transnational organised criminality. 
It was stressed in the SOCTA methodology, that ‘The SOCTA is a present- and 
future-oriented threat assessment. It goes a step further then a situation report 
(which is retrospective and mainly statistical) as it takes into account possible 
future developments.’ (Council of the EU 2012, 4). Hence, the SOCTA methodology 
includes a ‘watch list’ of probable threats that need to be monitored as well as 
‘horizon scanning’ to detect and analyse new and emerging threats from serious 
and organised crime. 
The conceptual model, worked out by Europol in cooperation with the SOCTA 
expert group (composed of EU Member States, Europol’s third partner countries 
and organisations, European Commission and Council General Secretariat), consists 
of the four steps: the focus, the tools, the analysis and assessment, and the 
results. It begins with three focus points: organised criminal groups, serious and 
organised crime areas, and the environment on which they have an effect and by 
which they are facilitated. These elements are assessed with the use of three types 
of indicators and additionally Crime Relevant Factors. The latter are facilitating 
factors and vulnerabilities in the environment that have an influence on current 
and future opportunities or barriers for organised criminal groups and crime areas. 
These factors are analysed via horizon scanning, which aims to identify future 
trends in society and future crime threats making use of a Delphi exercise.  
The analysis and assessment reflects the very structure and organisation of 
Europol and police cooperation network centred on this agency. The analytical 
work starts from the reaching into the resources held by Europol which are 
catalogued and stored in Analytical Work Files. They may be combined with threat 
notices on new and emerging trends, specific threat assessments and other 
strategic reports developed at Europol. Additionally open sources intelligence is 
used to scan the crime environment. A preliminary analysis contributes to the 
development of tailored EU intelligence requirements. Similarly to the ‘old’ OCTA, 
intelligence requirements are contained in questionnaires sent to Member States as 
well as non-EU states and organisations that have strategic or operational 
agreements with Europol.  
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The core part of the analysis process is the processing of the data received from 
stakeholders and acquired from open sources and the assessment of the indicators 
and crime relevant factors. Adopting a holistic approach, Europol aims at 
interconnecting the available data sets and detecting synergies between threat 
assessment and horizon scanning as well as current and future threats. As a result, 
a list of recommended priorities on organised criminal groups and areas are 
formulated and delivered to the customers. These priorities, accompanied by 
argument maps, should be particularly useful in the preparation of multi-annual 
strategic plans in a later phase of the policy cycle (Council of the EU 2012). 
Comparing SOCTA to its predecessors, in the perspective of pre-crime 
anticipatory approach, it seems that the new criminal intelligence product offered 
by Europol is much more advanced, rich and substantial. First of all, tradecraft 
employed in SOCTA analysis cycle is more developed and evidently highlights 
potential future trends and issues (Europol 2013). It is mining a considerable 
amount of information and data acquired from variegated sources and bases. Next, 
it introduces to Europol’s analytical practice methods, tools and techniques typical 
for criminal intelligence models implemented by leading countries, not only in 
Europe, but also in the other continents. This methodological upgrade should bring 
about a prospective modernization of tradecraft in EU criminal intelligence area. 
Finally, threat assessment methodology embedded in SOCTA seems to be a good 
benchmark, or even best practice, for Member States which lag behind the leading 
countries in what concerns intelligence capabilities and information management. 
So, EU criminal intelligence tradecraft may encourage them to a more intense and 
productive cooperation with Europol in the exchange of information and criminal 
data. 
Academic advisors to the SOCTA analytical team in Europol aptly grasped the 
value added by SOCTA to pre-crime approach to EU internal security: ‘The SOCTA 
analysis brings to the foreground the dilemma and problems of prediction (that is 
often necessarily actuarial in character and therefore backward looking), 
contrasted with the need to be forward looking going beyond historical data to 
extrapolate to identify future change, and to facilitate effective proactive 
operational responses. A way of mitigating the difficulty of this may be the 
development at the Europol level of continuous crime trend scanning, extending 
the SOCTA process to support a more proactive approach.’ (Europol 2013, 44). 
SOCTA is a great step forward in the development and enrichment of EU 
criminal intelligence tradecraft. It does not mean, however, that this product 
perfectly fits the pre-crime anticipatory approach to internal security of the Union. 
The methodology is still behind the state-of-the-art applications employed by 
global powers. The final product still depends much on the contributions and 
uploads from Member States. Given the variety of ‘rules of engagement’ applied by 
national law enforcement services and thus responses to intelligence requirements 
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formulated by Europol, intelligence analysis made by this agency often falls short 
of expectations of practitioners, especially national intelligence officials in Member 
States. Following SOCTA methodology, crime matrices and cognitive maps could be 
created although so far, referring to the first ever SOCTA report published in 2013, 
one cannot find hard evidence of such advanced pro-active approach on the part of 
Europol. Nonetheless, SOCTA proves the qualitative potential of Europol and its 
ability to take advantage of diversified elements of criminal intelligence 
tradecraft. 
 
 Conclusions 
 
Didier Bigo noted that, ‘Pre crime strategy is then the child of intelligence 
led policing and the amplification of the tendency to have a proactive attitude 
towards crime and to try to control crime by analysing its patterns, its location, its 
occurrences and situations’ (Bigo 2012). It seems that the observation made by the 
eminent French scholar is shared by Member States and EU institutions and 
agencies responsible for the proper EU internal security governance. Strategic 
guidelines, political decisions and legal instruments adopted at EU level clearly 
determine the future of cooperation in the field of policing and criminal justice in 
the Union. As the present author already noticed, the centre of gravity in the area 
of intelligence co-operation among EU Member States has been concentrated 
rather on direct collaboration among the national services, quite often outside the 
framework of the EU (Müller-Wille 2008, 55-58). The logic of European cooperation 
inclined to search for a 'missing link’ in EU security policies and strategies – that of 
intelligence. Intelligence-led policing and criminal information management were 
considered to be a novel approach, taking advantage of communication 
technologies, large-scale EU-wide IT systems, forensic computer programmes and 
enhanced analytical capacities. Ongoing debate on an intelligence-led policing 
model and its practical benefits has led its participants towards the strategic 
thinking underlining the importance of linkages between national intelligence 
models, and international approaches to criminal threats and terrorist menace. The 
challenges of security governance, risk management, policy implementation and 
anticipatory decision-making were noticed also in the field of law enforcement. 
This explains the decision to launch an ECIM, to develop or amend its certain 
elements (policy cycle, threat assessments, information management) and – most 
importantly – take it as a relevant practical tool in the realm of counterterrorism 
and criminal prevention in the EU (Gruszczak 2013, 34-36). 
 In order to succeed, the pre-crime approach requires credible intelligence 
that is subjected to effective policing within local circumstances, crime hotspots 
and areas of elevated risk. As a result, criminal databases are rapidly inflating, 
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containing information stored automatically or condensed into analysis files, and 
reprocessed as needed for certain operational and cognitive purposes. The 
Intelligence-led policing, criminal intelligence models and policy cycles are 
evidence of efforts undertaken by competent EU institutions and agencies, in 
response to stimuli coming from particular Member States, in order to improve the 
management of sensitive information and criminal data delivered by the Member 
States.  
Intelligence process is still decentralised and subject to national 
predilections and habits, or national security cultures, which quite often restrict 
the scope of involvement in intelligence cooperation at EU level. The 
implementation of EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime has 
been an important event because for the first time a common single framework for 
criminal intelligence tradecraft was established to stimulate both Member States 
and EU agencies and institutions to enhance their capacity to deliver valuable 
inputs and obtain valuable and useful outcomes. This is crucial regarding prospects 
for the emergence of a robust, effective and legitimate intelligence community in 
the EU. So far, intelligence products offered by EU agencies are fairly useful but 
they lack high credibility due to restrictions imposed by individual Member States 
on the transmission of sensitive information and raw material they possess. This 
may result from the low confidence in EU-led methods, instruments and measures 
adopted in the realm of criminal intelligence. But such a sceptical attitude do not 
necessarily corresponds with the real capabilities of EU agencies.   
Besides the leading products like Europol’s SOCTA and TE-SAT or Frontex’s 
FRAN and ARA, one can find numerous tailored analyses addressing specific 
requests by consumers, especially responding to the needs concerning prevention, 
anticipation and foreknowledge about the most serious threats, risks and hazards. 
These products seek to satisfy the strategic and operational needs of law 
enforcement services in Member States and they also attempt to develop and 
widen cognitive capabilities of an EU intelligence community emerging on grounds 
of internal security governance. 
Intelligence tradecraft developed in recent years in the field of EU internal 
security has been characterised by the progressive adaptation and implementation 
of qualitative and quantitative methods of data analysis and information 
management by competent EU agencies, most of all Europol and Frontex. This 
trend corresponds with the reinforcement of the pre-crime approach focused on 
anticipation, early detection and warning of potential and substantial threats and 
hazards. Strategic intelligence is the area where the EU can and should convince its 
Member States and external partners of its utility, relevance and appropriateness. 
A continuously improved intelligence tradecraft is an argument for the further 
development and enhancement of the pre-crime approach to EU internal security 
governance. 
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